Cable Viewer

The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09MANAMA599.

Reference ID	Created	Released	Classification	Origin
09MANAMA599	2009-10-13 11:11	2011-02-18 21:09	CONFIDENTIAL	Embassy Manama

VZCZCXRO8418
PP RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHDIR
DE RUEHMK #0599 2861139
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 131139Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY MANAMA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8961
INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHBVAKS/COMUSNAVCENT

C O N F I D E N T I A L MANAMA 000599 
 
SIPDIS 
 
P FOR STEPHEN MULL 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/13/2019 
TAGS: PREL PARM IR BA
SUBJECT: BRIEFING ON OUTCOME OF P5+1 TALKS 
 
REF: A. STATE 103219 
     ¶B. MANAMA 597 
 
Classified By: CDA CHRISTOPHER HENZEL FOR REASONS 1.4(B) AND (D). (C) CDA made ref A points on Iran to Foreign Minister Shaikh Khalid on October 8, and to Crown Prince Shaikh Salman on October 13. Both confirmed that Bahrain supports the dual-track strategy. The Crown Prince reiterated his concern that Tehran was using the P5 1 process to play for time, and agreed to use official Bahraini contacts with Iran to keep the commitments it made in Geneva. HENZEL

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Viewing cable 09MANAMA599, BRIEFING ON OUTCOME OF P5+1 TALKS